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attorney,  managed the legal support service enterprise. The LLC 
also provided consulting services to attorneys and health 
maintenance organizations (the other 50 percent owner of the 
LLC, the husband, was a medical doctor who worked full-time 
in a medical school). 
The LLC incurred losses during the years at issue from the 
real estate leasing and support services activities which were used 
to offset gains from the consulting activity with the net losses 
passed through to the LLC owners.16 The taxpayers classified 
the losses as nonpassive which allowed the netting of the losses. 
The Internal Revenue Service took the position that the LLCs 
leasing activities were per se passive and, therefore, were limited 
by the passive activity rules.17 
The Tax Court, agreeing with the taxpayers, rejected the IRS 
argument that the leasing activities were per se passive and held 
that the taxpayers qualified for the “extraordinary personal 
services” exception under the passive activity rules for rental 
property.18 The court agreed that the taxpayers had proved that 
the use of the leased real property by the tenants was incidental 
to the receipt of the LLCs services.19 The temporary regulations 
state that extraordinary personal services are provided in 
connection with making property available to users “. . . only if 
the services provided in connection with the use of the property 
are performed by individuals, and the use. . . of the property is 
incidental to their receipt of such services.”20 
In addition to proving that the extraordinary personal services 
exception applied, the taxpayers also had to show that they had 
materially participated in the activity.21 The Tax Court found the 
testimony compelling that wife’s involvement exceeded the 500 
hours required in the first of the seven tests for material 
participation.22 
In conclusion 
The Tax Court concluded that the LLCs activities were not 
passive activities, the losses were not passive and the losses could 
be netted with the other income of the LLC. Unless reversed on 
appeal, this case could be a useful template for planning in other 
settings where leasing occurs and extraordinary personal services 
are performed. The rejection of the IRS argument that the leasing 
activities were per se passive was a major development in the 
case. 
FOOTNOTES

1 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 61.02[5](2005); 
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(2000), rev’d, 250 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001), on remand, 118 T.C. 
323 (2002) (owner of S corporation providing management 
services to real estate partnership could not offset passive 
deductions from partnership against nonpassive income from 
management fees earned by S corporation; real estate activity could 
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5  I.R.C. § 469(c)(1). 
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20 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(v). 
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ANIMALS 
BULL. The plaintiff worked as a carpenter for another carpenter 
who was performing woodworking services for the farmer 
defendant. The plaintiff was injured by a bull while working in a 
barn in which the bull was allowed to roam so as to impregnate 
cows. The plaintiff sued in strict liability and negligence to recover 
for the injuries. The court held that the defendant would be liable 
for personal injuries caused by the bull only if the defendant knew 
or should have known that the bull had vicious or violent 
propensities. The plaintiff did not provide any evidence of vicious 
or violent propensities of the bull and the defendant provided 
evidence that the bull had never attacked anyone before. The 
plaintiff provided expert testimony that breeding bulls were 
generally dangerous and vicious. The court held that evidence of 
the propensities of bulls in general was insufficient to meet the 
evidentiary requirement to show the propensities of the bull 
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involved in the injury. summary judgment for the defendant was 
upheld. Bard v. Jahnke, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2668 (N.Y. 
S. Ct. 2005). 
HORSES. The plaintiff, a minor, was injured while taking 
horse riding lessons at the defendant’s stables. The plaintiff and 
a parent had filled out three releases before the plaintiff took the 
first lesson. The plaintiff filed a negligence suit and the defendant 
sought a summary judgment, arguing that the releases and the 
Wisconsin equine immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895-481, 
prevented the negligence claim. The trial court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant based on the releases and immunity 
statute. The plaintiff argued that an exception to the equine 
immunity statute applied because the defendant failed to safely 
manage the plaintiff’s horse based on the inexperience of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff offered the affidavit of another horse riding 
instructor that the lack of experience of the plaintiff required more 
control over the horse than was given by the defendant. The court 
held that the affidavit was sufficient evidence of a fact issue to 
deny summary judgment based on the equine immunity statute 
defense. The plaintiff also argued that the releases were void as 
against public policy. The court held that the releases were void 
because the releases were overbroad in the scope of activities 
covered, the persons released from liability, and the persons 
covered by the releases. Mettler v. Nellis, 2005 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). 
BANKRUPTCY 
FEDERAL TAXATION 
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and received a 
discharge. After the discharge, the IRS audited the 1987 tax return 
of a corporation owned by the debtor and liquidated in 1988. The 
IRS determined that the corporation owed taxes for 1987 and that 
the debtor was personally responsible for those taxes because the 
corporation made distributions of property to the debtor in 1987. 
The debtor argued that the debtor’s transferee liability for the 
corporation’s taxes was not a tax; therefore, the liability was 
discharged in the Chapter 7 case. The court held that I.R.C. § 
6901(a) provided for collection of transferee liability in the same 
manner as collection of a tax liability; therefore, the debtor’s 
transferee liability was in the nature of a tax and was not discharged 
in the Chapter 7 case. In re McKowen, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,242 (10th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 263 B.R. 618 (D. Colo. 
2001). 
The debtor failed to timely file and pay taxes for 1992 through 
1996 and the IRS constructed substitute returns for making an 
assessment of the taxes, interest and penalties due. The debtor 
filed the returns for those years in 1999 and the IRS abated some 
of the assessed taxes based on the filed returns. The debtor filed 
for Chapter 7 in February 2003 and sought a discharge of the 
1992 through 1996 taxes. The IRS argued that the debtor’s returns 
did not qualify as returns for purposes of Section 523(a)(1) because 
they were filed after substitute returns were constructed and the 
taxes assessed. The court held that the debtor’s returns did qualify 
as returns because the IRS made use of the returns in abating 
some of the taxes. In re Colsen, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,240 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 2005), aff’g, 2004-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,304 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004). 
The debtor had failed to timely file income taxes for several 
years but eventually filed the returns for 1983 through 1990 in 
1992. The IRS acknowledged receipt of all but the 1986 return. 
The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and received a discharge but the 
IRS argued that the 1986 taxes owed were not discharged because 
no return was filed. The debtor presented evidence of a signed 
and dated copy of the 1986 return which was also signed by the 
return preparer. The court held that the copy of the return and the 
fact that the return was filed with several other returns which 
were received moved the burden of proof to the IRS to show that 
it did not receive the return. Because the IRS filed to prove that 
the return was not filed, the court held that the 1986 taxes were 
discharged. The IRS also argued that the filing of the 1986 return 
six years after it was due was not an “honest and reasonable 
attempt” to meet the filing requirements and should not be 
considered a return for purposes of Section 523(a)(B). The court 
held that, because the late returns were filed in order to enable 
the debtor to make offers in compromise, the returns served a 
valid good faith purpose and would be considered valid returns 
for purposes of the discharge of the taxes owed. In re Payne, 
2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,226 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’g, 
2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,210 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
CONTRACTS 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. The plaintiff approached the 
defendant bank for loans in order to obtain funds to purchase a 
partner’s interest in land and cattle which were being auctioned. 
The plaintiff and bank were unable to execute a written loan 
agreement before the auction and the plaintiff obtained oral 
permission from a bank officer to purchase the cattle in 
expectation that the loan would be made. The plaintiff purchased 
all of the cattle but the bank failed to make the loan. The plaintiff 
sued for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, and fraud. The bank moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the statute of frauds barred the 
plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff argued the doctrines of part 
performance, equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel 
prevented the bank from raising the statute of frauds as a defense. 
The court held that the doctrine of part performance did not 
apply because, although the plaintiff did perform the purchase 
of the cattle, the alleged oral agreement was not complete. The 
court noted that the amount of the loan and the interest rate 
were not set, the security was not identified, the repayment period 
was not identified and the default rights of the parties were not 
clear. The court also refused to apply the doctrines of promissory 
and equitable estoppel for the same reason. In addition, the court 
held that no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing occurred because a complete agreement was not 
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reached. The court rejected the fraud claim because it found 
that the plaintiff knew that a promise to make a loan was 
unenforceable unless it was in writing. Lettunich v. Key Bank, 
2005 Ida. LEXIS 61 (Idaho 2005). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
BIOTERRORISM. The APHIS has adopted as final 
regulations governing the possession, use, and transfer of 
biological agents and toxins that have been determined to have 
the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, 
to animal health, to plant health, or to animal or plant products. 
70 Fed. Reg. 13241 (March 18, 2005). 
CONSERVATION SECURITY PROGRAM. The CCC has 
adopted as final regulations for administering the Conservation 
Security Program which provides financial and technical 
assistance to agricultural producers who, in accordance with 
certain requirements, conserve and improve the quality of soil, 
water, air, energy, plant and animal life, and support other 
conservation activities. 70 Fed. Reg. 15201 (March 25, 2005). 
DISASTER PROGRAMS. The CCC has adopted as final 
regulations implementing portions of the Military Construction, 
Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 2005 to authorize crop-loss disaster 
assistance for producers who suffered 2003, 2004, or 2005 crop 
losses caused by damaging weather and related conditions. Also 
included under this rule is authority for disaster assistance 
specifically for producers in Virginia, and producers of fruit 
and vegetable crops located in North Carolina that suffered 
losses due to adverse weather and related conditions that 
occurred in 2003. 70 Fed. Reg. 15725 (March 29, 2005). 
The CCC has adopted as final regulations implementing the 
2003-2004 Livestock Assistance Program (LAP) as provided 
for by the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency 
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2005. Under 
LAP, assistance will be available to livestock producers for 
either 2003 or 2004 grazing losses in a county that was 
designated as a primary disaster county by the President or the 
Secretary of Agriculture after January 1, 2003, for certain losses 
occurring through December 31, 2004. Assistance will be made 
available in the same manner as was provided under the 2002 
LAP. 70 Fed. Reg. 16392 (March 31, 2005). 
FARM PROGRAMS. The CCC has announced the 
extension, until October 31, 2005, of the period in which CCC 
will automatically reduce any Direct and Counter-Cyclical 
Payments to satisfy a producer’s obligation to repay unearned 
2003-crop advance counter-cyclical payments. Scheduled 
payments received during this period include 2004-crop final 
direct payments, 2004-crop advance counter-cyclical payments, 
and 2005-crop advance direct payments. 70 Fed. Reg. 13443 
(March 21, 2005). 
KARNAL BUNT. The APHIS has issued interim 
regulations adding areas in La Paz, Maricopa and Pinal 
Counties in Arizona and in Riverside County, CA to the list of 
regulated areas and removing areas in Maricopa and Pinal 
Counties in Arizona and Imperial County, CA  from the list of 
regulated areas. 70 Fed. Reg. 15553 (March 28, 2005).
   FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS. The 
decedent had obtained other residential rental property in 
exchange for the decedent’s residence. The new property was 
transferred to a trust for the decedent’s benefit which 
transferred the property to a family limited partnership. The 
decedent had transferred partnership interests to heirs before 
the decedent’s death. The court held that the property was 
included in the decedent’s estate because the court found that 
there existed an implied agreement that the decedent would 
receive all the income from the property and that the property 
remained as collateral for decedent’s loan obligations. The 
court also held that the transfer to the partnership was not a 
bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration because 
the transfer was not made in good faith. The court held that 
the transfer was not made in good faith because (1) the 
decedent was not able to meet financial obligations after the 
transfer; (2) the partners did not meet the formalities of the 
partnership, such as by keeping separate partnership records; 
and (3) the decedent received only tax benefits from the 
transfer.  Estate of Bigelow v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005­
65. 
TRUSTS. The IRS has issued a revenue procedure 
providing a safe harbor for any charitable remainder annuity 
trust (CRAT) or charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT) that is 
created by the grantor, if: (1) the grantor’s surviving spouse 
has a right under state law to elect on the grantor’s death to 
receive an elective, statutory share of the grantor’s estate, 
and (2) such share could be satisfied in whole or in part from 
assets of the CRAT or CRUT in violation of I.R.C. § 
664(d)(1)(B) (in the case of a CRAT) and I.R.C. § 
664(d)(2)(B) (in the case of a CRUT). The statutes provide 
that no amount other than the annuity payments or the unitrust 
payments may be paid to or for the use of any person other 
than a charitable organization. To qualify for the safe harbor, 
the spouse must irrevocably waive the right to elect his or 
her statutory share in the manner prescribed. For trusts created 
before June 28, 2005, the IRS will disregard the right of 
election, even without a waiver, but only if the spouse does 
not exercise the right of election. Rev. Proc. 2005-24, I.R.B. 
2005-16. 
The taxpayer operated a floor installation business from 
the taxpayer’s residence as a sole proprietor before 
transferring the business assets to a trust. The court looked at 
the four factors used in Markosian v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 1235 
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(1980), to determine whether the trust was a sham and should 
be disregarded for income tax purposes.. The court held that 
the trust was included in the taxpayer’s income because the 
trust had no economic substance in that (1) the taxpayer’s 
relationship to the business did not change after the transfer 
and the taxpayer was not subject to any trustee in making 
decisions about the business; (2) the trust did not have an 
independent trustee and the taxpayer continued to exercise 
complete control over the business; (3) distributions from 
the trust were primarily for the benefit of the taxpayer and 
did not benefit other interest holders in the trust; and (4) the 
use of the trust did not impose any restrictions on the 
taxpayer’s control of the business or other assets. Edwards 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-52. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ALIMONY. The taxpayer lived in California, a 
community property state. The taxpayer’s divorce decree 
required the taxpayer to pay the former spouse a monthly 
amount equal to one-half of the taxpayer’s pension benefits 
to which the taxpayer was entitled whether or not the taxpayer 
was retired. The taxpayer was eligible for retirement but had 
not retired in 2000 so the taxpayer had to make the payments 
from wage income and deducted the payments from taxable 
income. The IRS argued that the payments were not 
deductible because the taxpayer was not retired when the 
payments were made and the deduction violated the 
assignment of income rules. The court held that the payments 
qualified for exclusion because the payments were made 
under the divorce decree as a division of community property. 
The court also held that the exclusion of the payments did 
not violate the assignment of income rules in that, under the 
community property rules, the former spouse was already 
entitled to one-half of the taxpayer’s income.  Dunkin v. 
Comm’r, 124 T.C. No. 10 (2005). 
CASUALTY LOSSES. Note: The following summary 
appeared on p. 44 supra with an error in the fourth sentence. 
We regret the error.  The summary should have read as 
follows: The taxpayer purchased for $5,000 a remainder one-
fourth interest in two 40 acre tracts of rural land with the 
intent to make a profit. On one tract stood a barn with a fair 
market value of $46,000 which was destroyed by a wind 
storm. The taxpayer claimed a casualty loss for the full market 
value of the barn less the salvage value of the lumber, $2,000. 
The court held that the taxpayer’s casualty loss deduction 
was limited to the lesser [Note: was incorrectly “greater” in 
the original summary.] of the taxpayer’s basis in the barn or 
one-fourth of the fair market value of the barn, less one-
fourth of the salvage value. The court allocated $1,350 of 
the taxpayer’s original purchase price to the barn and held 
that the taxpayer’s casualty loss deduction was limited to 
that amount.  McClune v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-47. 
COOPERATIVES. The taxpayer was a C corporation which 
marketed and sold products produced by franchise holders. The 
taxpayer’s shareholders, including many of the franchisees, voted 
to change the structure of the corporation to qualify as operating 
on a cooperative basis. The new structure converted the 
franchisees into patrons and converted control of the taxpayer to 
democratic control by the franchisees/patrons. The taxpayer’s 
net earnings were to be distributed to the franchisees/patrons in 
proportion to amount of business conducted with each patron. 
The taxpayer identified several business reasons for the change, 
including better management of the franchises and production, 
marketing and development of the products. The IRS ruled that 
the taxpayer would be considered as operating on a cooperative 
basis under I.R.C. § 1381. Ltr. Rul. 200512001, Dec. 3, 2004. 
CORPORATIONS 
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned 40 
percent of the stock of a corporation to which the taxpayer 
provided services. The corporation made payments of the 
taxpayer’s personal federal income tax and state income tax. The 
corporation made cash disbursements to the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer charged personal items to the corporation’s credit card. 
The taxpayer claimed that the payments and distributions were 
loans. The court examined five of the seven factors of a loan/ 
constructive dividend determination used in Welch v. Comm’r, 
204 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2000), affg., T.C. Memo. 1998-121, to 
hold that the payments, distributions and charges were loans— 
(1) deductions were made from the taxpayer’s salary which were 
charged as interest to the taxpayer; (2) the taxpayer made 
repayment of the distributions in the past; (3) the taxpayer had 
sufficient income to repay the outstanding amount; (4) the 
corporation had sufficient assets to make the loans; and (5) the 
taxpayer and corporation both treated the items as loans. 
Morrison v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-53. 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The plaintiff 
filed complaints against a former employer for employment 
discrimination based on whistleblower provisions in six 
environmental statutes. The plaintiff sought, and was awarded, 
damages for mental pain and anguish and for damage to personal 
reputation. The court held that the first test of Commissioner v. 
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995), was met in that the six statutes 
created tort-like actions but the second test of a claim based on 
physical injuries was not met because mental pain and anguish 
were not physical personal injury. Although the plaintiff suffered 
from Bruxism (gnashing of teeth while sleeping), the court noted 
that the physical damage resulted from the mental anguish and 
not from the discrimination. Therefore, the court held that the 
judgment payments were included in income. Murphy v. I.R.S., 
2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,237 (D. D.C. 2005. 
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has issued tables detailing the 
(1) limitations on depreciation deductions for owners of passenger 
automobiles first placed in service during calendar year 2005, 
including separate limitations on passenger automobiles designed 
to be propelled primarily by electricity and built by an original 
equipment manufacturer (electric automobiles); (2) the amounts 
to be included in income by lessees of passenger automobiles 
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first leased during calendar year 2005, including separate 
inclusion amounts for electric automobiles; and (3) the 
maximum allowable value of employer-provided automobiles 
first made available to employees for personal use in calendar 
year 2005 for which the vehicle cents-per-mile valuation rule 
provided under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(e) may be applicable. 
For passenger automobiles (other than electric automobiles) 
placed in service in 2005 the depreciation limitations are as 
follows: 
Tax Year Amount 
1st tax year .......................................... $2,960

2d tax year ............................................. 4,700

3d tax year ............................................. 2,850

Each succeeding year ........................... 1,675

For trucks and vans placed in service in 2005 the 
depreciation limitations are as follows: 
Tax Year Amount 
1st tax year .......................................... $3,260

2d tax year ............................................. 5,200

3d tax year ............................................. 3,150

Each succeeding year ........................... 1,875

For electric automobiles placed in service in 2005 the 
depreciation limitations are as follows: 
Tax Year Amount 
1st tax year .......................................... $8,880

2d tax year ........................................... 14,200

3d tax year ............................................. 8,450

Each succeeding year ........................... 5,125 
Rev. Proc. 2005-13, I.R.B. 2005-12, 759. 
INSURANCE PAYMENTS. The taxpayer had purchased 
credit insurance on two credit card accounts insurng against 
death, disability and unemployment. When the taxpayer 
became unemployed, the insurance made the payments on the 
credit card in 2001. The taxpayer did not include these 
payments in income, arguing that the payments were similar 
to insurance payments for casualty losses. The court held that 
the payments were income because the payments did not 
replace any capital interests lost by the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer had no basis in the credit card liability.  Bunker v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2005-35. 
OFFER IN COMPROMISE. The taxpayers, husband and 
wife, exercised some incentive stock options which resulted 
in alternative minimum tax liability. The stock dropped 
significantly in value after the exercise. The taxpayers paid 
some of the tax liability but offered to settle the remaining 
$125,000 tax liability for $4,200. The IRS rejected the offer 
in compromise because the taxpayers had sufficient assets and 
income to pay the tax. The taxpayer argued that the offer in 
compromise should have been accepted because the stock 
dropped in value and the taxes owed exceeded the value of 
the stock. The court held that the IRS did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting the offer in compromise. Speltz v. 
Comm’r, 124 T.C. No. 9 (2005). 
PARTNERSHIPS 
BASIS ADJUSTMENTS. Under the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004, a partnership is required to reduce its basis in 
partnership property upon a distribution of partnership property 
if there is a “substantial basis reduction.” Under I.R.C. § 734(d) 
a substantial basis reduction is defined as a downward 
adjustment of more than $250,000 if a Section 754 election 
were in effect at the time of the distribution. The 2004 Act also 
requires a partnership to reduce the basis of partnership property 
upon a transfer after October 22, 2004 of an interest in the 
partnership by sale or exchange or upon the death of a partner, 
if, at the time of the relevant transfer, the partnership has a 
“substantial built-in loss.” For these purposes, a partnership 
has a substantial built-in loss with respect to a transfer of a 
partnership interest if the partnership’s adjusted basis in the 
partnership’s property exceeds by more than $250,000 the fair 
market value of the property. The IRS has issued interim 
procedures for complying with the 2004 Act provisions and will 
issue regulations implementing the 2004 Act provisions.  Notice 
2005-32, I.R.B. 2005-16. 
INSTALLMENT OBLIGATIONS. The IRS has adopted as 
final regulations governing income tax treatment of installment 
obligations acquired by partnerships. Under the regulations, 
installment obligations acquired by a partnership are I.R.C. § 
704(c) property if the obligation is acquired in exchange for 
partnership Section 704(c) property or under a contract. The 
new rules apply to installment obligations acquired on or after 
November 24, 2003. 70 Fed. Reg. 14394 (March 22, 2005). 
RETURNS. Tax professionals who e-file five or more 
accepted individual or business returns in a calendar year may 
now use three of the IRS’s e-Service products previously 
reserved for those who e-filed 100 or more individual returns: 
Disclosure Authorization (DA), Electronic Account Resolution 
(EAR), and Transcript Delivery System (TDS). DA allows tax 
professionals to complete, view and modify disclosure 
authorization forms, including Form 2848, Power of Attorney 
and Declaration of Representative, and Form 8821, Tax 
Information Authorization. EAR allows tax professionals, who 
already have power of attorney, to send and receive information 
electronically about individual account problems, refunds, 
installment agreements, missing payments or notices. TDS 
allows tax professionals with power of attorney to request and 
receive account and various other transcripts. IR-2005-33. 
The IRS has issued the following revised forms: Publication 
1542 (Revised January 2005), Per Diem Rates. The IRS notes 
that as of April 1, 2005, print copies of Publication 1542 can no 
longer be ordered but will continue to be available on the IRS 
web site. The January revision of Publication 1542 reflects 
changes in the per diem rates in Aurora, Colorado; Cocoa Beach, 
Florida; Dallas, Texas; and Great Neck, New Jersey. The forms 
are available on the IRS web site, www.irs.gov/formspubs/ 
index.html, in the Forms & Pubs section. 
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY. The taxpayer sold several 
real estate properties for a gain but did not file income tax 
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returns reporting the sales or gain. The taxpayer argued that 
the basis in each property was increased by several items for 
which the taxpayer did not have records, including personal 
labor, remodeling expenses, taxes and interest. The IRS 
disallowed these additions to basis for lack of substantiation 
and because the expenses were not incurred as part of a trade 
or business. The taxpayer’s response was several frivolous 
“tax protestor” arguments. The IRS assessed tax deficiencies 
based on the sale closing documents and disallowed any 
increase in basis for the expenses claimed by the taxpayer. 
The court upheld the IRS assessments and upheld imposition 
of the I.R.C. § 6651 penalty for failure to file a return, the 
I.R.C. § 6654 addition to tax for failure to pay estimate tax 
payments, and the I.R.C. § 6673 penalty for the making of 
frivolous arguments. Storaasli v. Comm’r, TC. Memo. 2005­
59. 
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The IRS has announced the 
applicable terminal charge and the Standard Industry Fare 
Level mileage rates for determining the value of 
noncommercial flights on employer-provided aircraft in effect 
for the first half of 2005 for purposes of the taxation of fringe 
benefits .Rev. Rul. 2005-14,  I.R.B. 2005-12, 749. 
PROPERTY 
BOUNDARY FENCE. The plaintiff and defendant owned 
neighboring properties divided by a fence. A survey in 2002 
showed the plaintiff’s property to extend beyond the fence. 
The testimony from both parties and their witnesses agreed 
that the fence was recognized as the dividing line between the 
properties, although a portion of the disputed property was 
used by everyone, including the general public, as a swimming 
hole. The court held that the unanimous testimony was 
sufficient to establish the fence as the boundary line by 
acquiescence. Mayes v. Massery, 2005 Ark. App. LEXIS 
255 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005). 
RIGHT-OF-WAY. The plaintiff owned property over which 
a railroad easement ran. The railroad right-of-way was granted 
prior to the date the federal government issued a land patent 
title to the first landowner of the land subject to the railroad 
right-of-way.  The railroad right-of-way was abandoned by 
the railroad in 1998 and the Surface Transportation Board 
(STB) of the U.S. Dept. of Transportation authorized The Land 
Concervancy of Seattle and King County to assume financial 
responsibility for the railroad right-of-way pursuant to the 
National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983. The STB 
approved the conversion of the railroad right-of-way to a 
recreational trail by issuing a Notice of Interim Trail Use 
(NITU). The plaintiff claimed that the issuing of the NITU 
constituted a governmental taking of the plaintiff’s property 
interest in the railroad right-of-way and sought compensation. 
The court held that the original grant of the railroad right-of­
way was a simple easement and the grant of the original title 
patent did not create a reversionary interest in the federal 
government which revested on the abandonment of the railroad 
right-of-way. The court noted that there remained many issues 
to be resolved and limited its holding to the reversionary interest 
in the railroad right-of-way.  Beres v. United States, 2005 U.S. 
Claims LEXIS 65 (Ct. Cls. 2005). 
STATUTORY WAY OF NECESSITY (EASEMENT). The 
plaintiff owned land-locked property neighboring the defendant’s 
property. The defendant had allowed the plaintiff to travel over 
the defendant’s land to access the plaintiff’s property but denied 
access, claiming that the plaintiff had leased the property to a 
hunt club whose members were annoying. The plaintiff sought 
a court order creating a statutory way of necessity, easement, 
under Fla. Stat. § 704. The trial court had granted the easement 
and awarded the defendant $500 as compensation. Under Fla. 
Stat. § 704.01(2) an easement is to be granted for land-locked 
property “used for a dwelling or dwellings or for agricultural or 
for timber raising or cutting or stock raising.” The defendant 
argued that the easement should have been limited to access for 
the purposes identified in the statute and not for hunting. The 
appellate court agreed and remanded the case for the trial court 
to limit the use of the easement to the purposes identified in the 
statute. Staten v. Gonzalez-Falla, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3592 
(Fla. Ct. App. 2005). 
STATE TAXATION 
AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiffs constructed seven 
temporary greenhouses on their farm land. One of the 
greenhouses was used for sales transactions and displays of the 
plants, while the other greenhouses were used to raise plants 
sold in the sales greenhouse. The customer transactions occurred 
only in the sales greenhouse and no plants were grown in the 
sales greenhouse except while on display for sale. Although all 
the greenhouses were taxed under the farmland tax exemption 
for several years, a new tax assessor determined that the 
greenhouses did not qualify for the exemption because the houses 
contained sales space in that customers could view the plants in 
the other greenhouses before purchase in the sales greenhouse. 
The plaintiffs did not seek the exemption for the sales greenhouse, 
but challenged the change of assessment for the other six 
greenhouses which were used primarily for growing the plants. 
All lower appeals were lost on the basis that the existence of 
retail sales space in one greenhouse destroyed the “single-use” 
nature of the greenhouses required for the exemption. Under 
N.J. Stat. § 54:4-23.12(a) greenhouses are excluded from the 
farmland exemption if they “enclose a space within [their] walls 
used for . . . office or sales space.”  The court held that the 
farmland exemption law contemplated that some sales activity 
would be allowed without disqualifying all of the greenhouses 
from the exemption; therefore, the six greenhouses were eligible 
for the farmland exemption as single-use agricultural structures. 
Township of Monroe v. Gasko, 2005 N.J. LEXIS 190 (N.J. 
2005). 
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ZONING 
EXCEPTIONS. The plaintiffs owned farmland which had 
been included in a city’s urban growth boundary and zoned 
“urban transition/farm.” The property was part of the city’s 
proposed industrial planning area but when the need for such 
property was removed, the city released the property back to 
the county. After hearings, the county passed an ordinance which 
zoned the plaintiff’s property as primary agricultural use 
property. The state Land Use Board of Appeals remanded the 
ordinance to the county for findings required by law. The county 
did not hold additional hearings but merely made additional 
findings and passed a new ordinance which zoned the plaintiff’s 
land as “exclusive farm use” (EFU) property based solely on 
the existence of Class II and III soil on the land. The plaintiff 
argued that the new ordinance was invalid because the county 
did not give the plaintiff any opportunity to present arguments 
or evidence at a hearing and that the plaintiff was entitled to an 
exception for residential use of the property based on an 
exception under the original zoning classification for the city. 
The court held that the county ordinance was invalid in that the 
county did not hold a new hearing and did not make findings on 
all factors which support a zoning classification of EFU: (1) 
soils that are suitable for agricultural production using accepted 
farming practices, especially Class I-IV soils; (2) areas of open 
land that are relatively free from non-farm conflicts and are still 
capable of being farmed; (3) areas that are in farm production 
or are capable of being farmed now or in the future; and (4) 
those other lands that are necessary to protect farm uses by 
limiting adjoining non-farm activities. The court held that the 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a residential use exception 
was part of the zoning classification by the city; therefore, no 
exception carried over to the county zoning classification. 
However, the court noted that the new hearing would give the 
plaintiff a chance to argue for the granting of an exception. 
Manning v. Land Conservation and Development Comm’n, 
2005 Ore. App. LEXIS 328 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
CITATION UPDATES 
Estate of Davis v. Comm’r, 394 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 2005), 
aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2003-55 (marital deduction) see p. 19 supra. 
IN THE NEWS 
WATER LAW. Plaintiff sought a declaration from the water 
court that its interest in water delivered to real property pursuant 
to two contracts was not perpetually restricted to irrigation of 
the property, but rather was a water right capable of being 
changed in point of diversion and place and type of use. The 
water court declared the nature and extent of petitioner’s water 
right under contract were limited to diversion from a specified 
location for irrigation use on identified lands. The appellate court 
affirmed and held that plaintiff neither owned a water right by 
virtue of appropriation nor hold shares in a mutual ditch 
company; rather, the plaintiff owned contractual delivery rights. 
Because the contracts were ambiguous, the court looked to 
extrinsic evidence to determine the nature of those delivery 
rights. In consideration of all the circumstances surrounding 
the formation of the delivery contracts, the court determined 
that the parties intended to create restrictive rights to receive a 
certain amount of water for the purpose of irrigating identified 
lands. Thus, the contract cannot support a change of use and a 
change of place of diversion. Colorado Supreme Court 
Opinions March 21, 2005 No. 03SA372, East Ridge of Fort 
Collins LLC v. The Larimer and Weld Irrigation Company. 
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